Sean Cleary

Executive Vice-Chair of Future World Foundation

Sean Cleary is Chairman of Strategic Concepts (Pty) Ltd, Executive Vice-Chair of Future World Foundation and Managing Director of the Centre for Advanced Governance. He has a B.A. in Social Sciences and Law at the University of South Africa and MBA from Henley Business School. He specializes in strategy development, risk assessment and analysis, conflict management and resolution.

Introduction

In reflecting on the form of a rules-based international order that is appropriate for the present era, one must clarify the purposes of such an order, the structural and systemic characteristics that will enable the realisation of those purposes, and the means by which the order may be brought into existence.

The rules-based international order with which we have been familiar since 1945 may be described as “…a shared commitment by all countries to conduct their activities in accordance with agreed rules that evolve over time, such as international law, regional security arrangements, trade agreements, immigration protocols, and cultural arrangements.”

Western Perspectives

In an article in 2018, C. John Ikenberry commented on the origins of what he described as the liberal international order:

“After the Second World War, the United States and its partners built a multifaceted and sprawling international order, organized around economic openness, multilateral institutions, security cooperation and democratic solidarity. Along the way, the United States became the ‘first citizen’ of this order, providing hegemonic leadership—anchoring the alliances, stabilizing the world economy, fostering cooperation and championing ‘free world’ values. Western Europe and Japan emerged as key partners, tying their security and economic fortunes to this extended liberal order. After the end of the Cold War, this order spread outwards. Countries in East Asia, eastern Europe and Latin America made democratic transitions and became integrated into the world economy. As the postwar order expanded, so too did its governance institutions. NATO expanded, the WTO was launched and the G20 took centre stage. Looking at the world at the end of the twentieth century, one could be excused for thinking that history was moving in a progressive and liberal internationalist direction.”

Ikenberry, like many other authors, argues that this order is now in crisis:

“Trade, alliances, international law, multilateralism, environment, torture and human rights—on all these issues, President Trump has made statements that, if acted upon, would effectively bring to an end America’s role as leader of the liberal world order. Simultaneously, Britain’s decision to leave the EU, and a myriad other troubles besetting Europe, appear to mark an end to the long postwar project of building a greater union. The uncertainties of Europe, as the quiet bulwark of the wider liberal international order, have global significance. Meanwhile, liberal democracy itself appears to be in retreat, as varieties of ‘new authoritarianism’ rise to new salience in countries such as Hungary, Poland, the Philippines and Turkey. Across the liberal democratic world, populist, nationalist and xenophobic strands of backlash politics have proliferated.”

Rainer Hildebrand is no less forthright:

“The multilateral, rule-based system of global governance is increasingly under pressure. Multilateral trade talks under the auspices of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) have stalled, while discriminatory bilateralism, economic nationalism and protectionism flourish, leading to a more fragmented world economy. The Paris Agreement on climate protection – though a huge multilateral success with 197 signatories – is jeopardised as the USA, the second biggest greenhouse gas emitter worldwide, has decided to withdraw by 2020. Important regional anchors of stability such as NATO and the EU appear more fragile…. More fundamentally, the idealand foundations of the liberal world order seem to be challenged, an order in which countries cooperate via multilateral institutions based on shared values such as democracy, open markets and the international rule of law (Maihold 2018).”

Ikenberry comments on the emergence of the crisis:

“With the end of the Cold War, liberal internationalism was globalized. Initially, this was seen as a moment of triumph for western liberal democracies. But the globalization of the liberal order put in motion two shifts that later became the sources of crisis. First, it upended the political foundations of the liberal order. With new states entering the system, the old bargains and institutions that provided the sources of stability and governance were overrun. A wider array of states— with a more diverse set of ideologies and agendas— were now part of the order. This triggered what might be called a ‘crisis of authority’, where new bargains, roles and responsibilities were now required. These struggles over authority and governance continue today. Second, the globalization of the liberal order also led to a loss of capacity to function as a security community. This can be called a ‘crisis of social purpose’. In its Cold War configuration, the liberal order was a sort of full-service security community, reinforcing the capacity of western liberal democracies to pursue policies of economic and social advancement and stability. As liberal internationalism became the platform for the wider global order, this sense of shared social purpose and security community eroded.”

Hillebrand approaches the same elements from a complementary, less U.S.-centric perspective :

“First and foremost, a global shift in power is undermining this existing liberal order... Countries such as China, India, Brazil and Russia, among others, have emerged … demanding more votes and/or seats at the table in … the UN Security Council, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. They use their influence to re-calibrate the normative cornerstones of the liberal system by re-interpreting concepts such as human rights, market economy and the right to self-determination (Boyle 2016:49). Some emerging countries have started to establish alternative structures, for instance the BRICS’ New Development Bank and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement, institutions that mirror the World Bank and IMF. Moreover, they are operating more pro-actively and unilaterally, as reflected by China’s strategic initiatives in Africa and Asia. All these developments result in a polycentric rather than a Western-dominated world … not least because the traditional ‘rule-takers’ and aid receivers in the developing world can now turn to alternative powers and thereby evade US and European dominance (Boyle 2016, Hillebrand 2019).”

“In addition, political change in many Western countries has weakened the idea of multilateralism. Some political actors blame neoliberal globalisation, and the multilateral institutions that represent it, for undermining democratically legitimised policies, such as fair corporate taxation and high social and environmental standards. Others engage in populist ‘identity’ politics, pushing for anti-liberal, pro-nationalistic courses. They discredit multilateral compromises and time-consuming negotiations, bewailing the loss of national sovereignty. Concomitantly, a new type of political leader has assumed power: one that seems to focus on a narrowly defined national self-interest and zero-sum outcomes rather than the shared benefits of global public goods. Accordingly, short-lived flexible power coalitions are favoured over long-term, strategic alliances; and populist power demonstrations, geared toward national audiences, replace restraint and moderation, as demonstrated, for example, by US-President Trump’s approach to the trade conflict with China where public threats seem to dominate over functional diplomacy.”

The Russian View

Over a decade before the flurry of articles by Western authors expressing concern about the demise of the liberal rules-based international order, Russian President Vladimir Putin had delivered an address at the Munich Security Conference in February 2007. Noting that “international security comprises much more than military and political stability…[but also] the stability of the global economy, overcoming poverty, economic security and developing a dialogue between civilisations”, Mr Putin criticised the “unipolar world” that had emerged, describing it as being defined by “one centre of authority, one centre of force, one centre of decision-making… one master, one sovereign.” He argued that this was “… pernicious not only for all those within this system, but also for the sovereign itself because it destroys itself from within.”

Saying that “…the model itself is flawed because at its basis there … can be no moral foundations for modern civilisation…”, Mr Putin criticised “…[u]nilateral and frequently illegitimate actions [by the United States that have]… caused new human tragedies and created new centres of tension… an almost uncontained hyper use of … military force in international relations … that is plunging the world into an abyss of permanent conflicts…,[and] greater disdain for the basic principles of international law… One state … the United States, has overstepped its national borders in every way.”

Mr Putin described this as “… extremely dangerous….[as] no one feels safe… [b] ecause no one can feel that international law … will protect them. Of course such a policy stimulates an arms race…inevitably encourage[ong] a number of countries to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Moreover… new threats … have appeared, and …threats such as terrorism have taken on a global character. I am convinced that we have reached that decisive moment when we must seriously think about the architecture of global security…searching for a reasonable balance between the interests of all participants in the international dialogue. Especially since the international landscape is so varied and changes so quickly … in light of the dynamic development in … countries and regions.”

Referencing the economic advancement of the BRICS, especially China and India, Mr Putin observed that “... the economic potential of the new centres of global economic growth will inevitably be converted into political influence and will strengthen multipolarity.” He argued for a greater role for multilateral diplomacy, based on openness, transparency and predictability, with the use of force being an exceptional measure, “…comparable to using the death penalty in the judicial systems of certain states.”

Referring to the “peaceful transformation of the Soviet regime” into the Russian Federation, he argued that the world should also not be indifferent to “…various internal conflicts inside countries, to authoritarian regimes, to tyrants, and to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction…”. He argued that “…the only mechanism that can make decisions about using military force as a last resort is the Charter of the United Nations. When the UN will truly unite the forces of the international community and can really react to events in various countries, when we will leave behind this disdain for international law, then the situation will be able to change. Otherwise, the situation will simply result in a dead-end, and the number of serious mistakes will be multiplied. Along with this, it is necessary to make sure that international law has a universal character both in the conception and application of its norms.”

The People’s Republic of China

The shock of the global financial crisis led China, after 2008, to conclude that an international order premised on Western mores, and U.S. primacy was no longer sustainable.

As its growing economic strength began to translate into political influence, and the Chinese government became more confident about engaging in global governance, Beijing first saw the G20 as a preferred platform from which to advance its view of a beneficial world order. At the 10th G20 Summit on November 15–16, 2015, ahead of the 11th G20 summit in Hangzhou on 4–5 September 2016, Xi Jinping announced China’s theme and approach for the 2016 Summit: “Build up an innovative, invigorated, interconnected, and inclusive world economy.” (emphasis added)

This Chinese strategy comprised four elements: (1) innovate for growth, advancing reforms and innovation, defining and grasping new opportunities to strengthen the growth of the world economy; (2) improve global economic and financial governance by enhancing the representation and voice of emerging markets and developing countries and strengthening the capability of the economy to manage risk; (3) construct an open, interconnected world economy, by promoting international trade and investment; and (4) advance inclusive development by implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, eradicating poverty, and realize mutual development.

China’s global economic strategy, supported by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the New Development Bank, the Silk Road Fund and the Belt and Road Initiative, recognises that countries are at different phases of development and have different strengths, and aims to align all countries’ interests in a cooperative system to promote inclusive and sustainable development and enable an optimal allocation of global economic resources, by integrating economy, society, and environment through effective governance.

In 2019, He Yafei, referencing President Xi Jinping’s report to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, pointed out that socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era, includes “making clear that major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics aims to foster a new type of international relations, and to build a community with a shared future for mankind.”

Against this backdrop, He Yafei has proposed a new discipline of global governance studies in China, with a research methodology that “should transcend sovereign states, transnational corporations regional or interest groups, and observe global issues from the perspective of global history and politics.” Pointing out that this will be “…distinct from disciplines and theories that originated from Europe and America…”, he argues that this new Chinese endeavour “…aims to dismantle the unbalanced global political, economic and cultural structures, and establish an order where justice and righteousness prevail.”

Inflection Point

We are thus at an inflection point, with political leaders and scholars from around the world recognising that a new international order is needed. In 2015, Background Papers declared for a conference at Chatham House :

“The international order established by the victorious allies after the Second World War has been remarkably enduring. The framework of liberal political and economic rules, embodied in a network of international organizations and regulations, and shaped and enforced by the most powerful nations, both fixed the problems that had caused the war and proved resilient enough to guide the world into an entirely new era.

“But given its antique origins, it is not surprising that this order now seems increasingly under pressure. Challenges are coming from rising or revanchist states; from unhappy and distrustful electorates; from rapid and widespread technological change; and indeed from the economic and fiscal turmoil generated by the liberal international economic order itself.”

The Royal Institute asserted that the order faced three serious challenges – of legitimacy, equity and self-confidence. These challenges, it argued, did not vitiate the need for a rules-based system, but indicated that the rules needed to be revised, and applied across the system. While the global order of the second half of the 20th century was built on a normative and legal structure based on Western values, no power can now found a world order on its values and norms. Sensibly, the Royal Institute counselled that the reform effort should first clarify the aims of the order, and then consider what structure was needed to achieve them.

The Purposes of a Rules-Based International Order

One reference point for the teleology of a rules-based international order might be Hedley Bull’s assertion, in 1977, that a global society must comprise: “a group of states, conscious of […] common interests and common values […] conceiv[ing] themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations to one another.”

This does not require states to align all national interests or societal values, but it does require them to recognize a certain quantum of common interests and values that justify the subordination of national discretion on occasion, for superior purposes. It does not require nations to abandon their cultures or states to abnegate their national interests, but it does require them to recognize that the exclusive pursuit of national interests, mindless of those of others, is deleterious to human welfare.

It is the purpose of normative systems to accommodate diversity in social contexts. Adherence to social norms promotes coherent behaviour within a group, allowing members to predict the responses of others with reasonable accuracy. Relatively coherent narratives frame and embed these norms, while social, economic, political and legal institutions provide the context in which they are enforced. Deference to universally accepted norms in the global system, and compliance with international law, thus promotes the acceptance of each state actor by others, while disregard of norms results in criticism, and, in more serious cases, punitive sanctions.

Achieving international and trans-cultural harmony thus requires collective agreement on what is essential and advantageous for all, while respecting the particularities of experience, perspective and belief that arise from our complex ecology. We need to recognize both the communal nature of humanity, and its different social forms in diverse geographical and cultural-historical contexts. The question, for purposes of policy, is how to address this polymorphic reality.

Complex modern societies, characterized by specialization, the division of labour, and social coordination, emerged through adaptation and social evolution in different environments, based on the capacity and disposition of people to cooperate under the influence of political narratives buttressed by institutions. The social norms underpinning each polity may be similar at abstract levels, but they are not identical. Actions by states, based on their governments’ perceptions of the national interest, and the military, economic, political and cultural capacity that constitute each state’s power, influence state behaviour and determine outcomes in interstate relations.

The role of norms and narratives in constituting a sense of national identity and purpose, and in constraining the naked pursuit of national interest, is thus not constant—as the behaviour of states as diverse as Turkey, Russia, Brazil, and the United States has made clear in the past five years. Likewise, the extent to which specific norms have permeated national societies is always uncertain until determined empirically. The adaptive response of large parts of U.S. Republican Party to the idiosyncratic stimuli effected by U.S. President Donald Trump is a case in point.

Meanwhile, states are by no means the only actors in the global landscape today. Corporations, faith groups, other non-governmental organisations, and, increasingly, activist citizen groups engaging on matters from climate to equity, are significant agents of social, economic and political change.

So, if we need a new rules-based international order, what are our priorities?

Paraphrasing David Held’s observation in 2006, a rules-based international order must address three core sets of problems - sharing our planet (addressing the existential challenges of climate change, oceans and biodiversity), sustaining humanity (addressing poverty and inequality, preventing and resolving conflict, containing the production and use of weapons of mass destruction, and enabling opportunity), and enabling agreement on binding rules (on trade, finance, intellectual property, taxation, terrorism and organised crime).

To address systemic global risks, and protect the shared services of the global commons, we need to address many challenges collectively. But trust in governments, business, and other institutions has been undermined (with many persons around the world fearful and angry), because of the tension between (a) citizens’ reasonable expectation that national leaders will protect and advance their interests; (b) the impact of global financial integration, long-supply chains, and rapid technological change on working people and the middle classes; and (c) the compromises needed to balance costs and benefits in international and cross-generational transactions.

He Yafei has quoted David Held on the “vast asymmetries of life chances within and between nation-states”, the effects of tariffs and subsidies in agriculture and textiles in destroying livelihoods in some countries, while protecting them in others; “the emergence of global financial flows that can rapidly destabilise national economies”, and “serious transnational problems involving the global commons.” Many attribute these inequities to structural and systemic defects in the rules-based international order arising from the principles of stabilisation, liberalisation and privatisation that emerged from the Washington Consensus; their rigid application after 1991 through “shock therapy” by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and in trade negotiations under the auspices of the World Trade Organization; and in counterproductive debates about the extent of common but differentiated responsibilities to combat the effects of emissions of GHGs.

Events over the past two decades—from the global financial crisis and recession, through military conflicts leading to massive displacement of civilian populations and forced migration, to extreme weather events reflecting the risk of crossing planetary boundaries—have shown how inadequate our present instruments are for squaring these circles.

The workings of the complex, adaptive earth system in which humanity—now over 7.7 billion strong—is embedded, and the global economic and social systems that we have created, are far too complex to be managed comprehensively. Human society is a complex system, incapable of collective control, as both absolute monarchs, and practitioners of scientific socialism, have learned. Homo sapiens is, moreover, a part of the biogeosphere, a more complex, adaptive system incorporating climate, the oceans, and the biodiversity of our terrestrial and marine environments.

To enable human security and well- being, we need to temper the impacts of human activity on the biogeosphere to avert the risk of disastrous, unintended consequences. While changes in the earth system—from floods and droughts, to earthquakes and volcanoes—have been a source of concern for millennia, aggregate human behaviour is now destabilizing the earth system, possibly pushing us past key tipping points. Limiting this damage and the risks it poses to humanity is imperative, but divergent views within and between national polities still frustrate appropriate collective action.

A rules-based international order that is fit for purpose in present circumstances must thus enable three outcomes:

• delivering economic growth that is socially equitable and environmentally sustainable;

   

• sharply reducing poverty and inequality, and enhancing opportunity;

   

• addressing the sources of global, national and individual vulnerability to promote security at human, national, regional and global scales.

   

  To achieve this, a rules-based order must:

   

• clarify and embody agreement on the values and norms that will enable our coexistence on one planet, while respecting our cultural differences; and

• significantly improve the quality of global governance by ensuring that our global institutions are both effective and accepted as legitimate by all.

   

  Achieving an Appropriate Structure and System

   

  We cannot achieve an order that meets these requirements in a vacuum. It requires far more than an intellectual endeavour. We live in a world of states, gathered in international organizations, and state sovereignty, while challenged in many ways, is the foundation of the global order. To advance a Global Agenda that will underpin a new rules- based international order, we need to understand the worldviews of state actors, notably their sense of their interests, and the values they employ in determining them. Likewise, we cannot restrict the discussion to governments. Non-state actors, and especially the youth, who will inhabit the order that we seek to construct, have essential voices.

   

  Drawing on the success of the negotiations in the COP 21 round of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change that led to the Paris Agreement, premised on credible, nationally determined contributions by states to reducing their emissions, and the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals in the 2030 Agenda, in September 2015, after multi-stakeholder discussions at national and regional levels, the United Nations Secretary-General has thus launched, under the rubric of UN@75 and Beyond, “…a forward-looking people-driven global conversation… on how to build a truly global partnership to realize our shared aspirations for a just, peaceful and sustainable future.” National dialogues will be conducted throughout 2020 to mark the 75th anniversary of the United Nations, bringing together “… people from all regions and walks of life … to discuss how we can collectively navigate the gap between the world we want and where we are [presently] headed…”.

   

  In the document introducing the UN@75 initiative, UN Secretary-General Guterres has said:

   

  “Tackling issues such as the climate crisis, poverty and inequality, protracted conflict, migration and displacement, and the rapid changes in demography and technology will require effective co-operation across borders, sectors and generations. Failure to do so will have far-reaching consequences for the welfare of our children and grandchildren – and our planet itself.

   

  “But just when we need bold collective action more than ever, multilateralism is being called into question. Unilateralism is on the rise, as the world becomes more multipolar but also more polarized. In many parts of the world, there is a growing disconnect between people and institutions. Renewed support for global cooperation could not be more urgent.

   

  “That urgency – expressed by UN Member States in several resolutions – is a driving factor for the UN@75 initiative, which will inspire dialogues across the world to collect diverse perspectives and creative ideas on what is needed to address emerging risks and opportunities. The initiative is aligned with the UN General Assembly’s plans to commemorate the 75th anniversary under the theme “The future we want, the UN we need” , reaffirming our collective commitment to multilateralism.

   

  “Using different communications and outreach tools, the dialogues will explore how renewed commitment to collective action can secure the world we want in 2045, when the UN reaches its 100th anniversary. They will be centered on two simple propositions – (1) the value of dialogue, and (2) the question “what if?” – that can be translated and adapted to spark conversations in all settings: from parliaments to village halls, from classrooms to boardrooms.

   

  “To have value, these conversations must be future-oriented. Young people will therefore be key drivers of the dialogues. As the Secretary-General recently said: “Young people must be able to participate in the decisions that affect their lives. We need to create an enabling environment for young people, where they are seen not as subjects to be protected, but as … full members of our societies, and as powerful agents for change.” The role of youth was also highlighted in the General Assembly’s resolution on the anniversary.”

  The UN@75 programme will be conducted under the leadership of the UN Secretary-General by the Special Adviser of the Secretary -General for UN@75, UN Under-Secretary-General Fabrizio Hochschild, supported by a core team of policy, communications, and advocacy professionals, and the Department of Global Communications.

   

  The aim of this endeavour is to achieve what Hedley Bull described as an acknowledgment of “common interests and common values […] [and acceptance of] a common set of rules in [states’] relations to one another.” This is both urgent and essential.

   

  The U.N Secretary-General’s decision to launch these dialogues, provides an opportunity to explore agreement on outcomes, before determining what structures and institutional systems are needed to achieve them. If all participate honestly, the dialogues will allow for reciprocal learning, help overcome prejudice, and undercut fact-free populism. One hopes that the discussions will clarify the values that motivate the objectives of states and citizen groups and shed light on the norms and legal instruments that can advance them.

   

  After receipt and analysis of the contributions from these dialogues, a UN General Assembly Open Working Group akin to that assembled for the 2030 Agenda, might be constituted, to reflect on and discuss the proposals, perhaps supported by a synthesis paper prepared by the UN Secretariat. This would allow us to define, drawing from the national dialogues, the shared interests and common values of humanity, the diversity of individual, community and national interests, and the hierarchies of values employed by different communities to order these.

   

  Recognising the need for radical reform of our present structures and systems, including institutions of global governance, regional governance, regional security, and national political governance; free markets, as we have defined them in the past half century; the relationship between education, training and employment in the face of the greatest technological transformation yet experienced by humanity; and the systems of social coexistence shaped by rapid urbanization followed by globalization, which are now under stress in most societies; the UN@75 initiative will afford an opportunity of reflecting on the purpose of a new order, the structure and systems we need to achieve that, and the means by which we can transition to a rules-based order that will allow us to achieve our collective purposes.

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