Karen A. Tramontano

Former Deputy Chief of Staff to President Clinton

From 1997 to 2001, she served as deputy chief of staff to President Bill Clinton. She is Co-Founder and Chief Executive Officer at Blue Star Strategies, LLC, a government relations and public affairs consultancy where she provides corporate, institutional, and public sector clients with results-oriented strategies.

On November 9, 2018, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres confronted the members of the UN Security Council with concerns regarding the weakened state of international multilateralism, arguing that “there is anxiety, uncertainty and unpredictability across the world. Trust is on the decline, within and among nations. People are losing faith in political establishments – national and global…it often seems that the more global the threat, the less we are able to cooperate.”

Secretary-General Guterres’ comments echo a worry increasingly vocalized by many politicians, world leaders, and academics. The relatively recent shift in the world order – widely recognized as unipolar and U.S.-led following the end of the Cold War but now increasingly bi- or multipolar with the rise of China and other emerging economies – appears to have shaken the foundations of the very multilateral institutions with the potential to stabilize the transition.

The most prominent of today’s multilateral institutions were developed in direct response to the global trauma of World War II. A return to stability, both politically and economically, and avoidance of further war had become international priorities. Upon their establishment in 1944 and 1945 respectively, the Bretton Woods Institutions (the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) and the United Nations sought to rebuild the postwar economy, promote economic integration, maintain global peace, and support cooperation among nations. The U.S. was a driving force in their founding and a key supporter in their early efforts. As a major world power and leading provider of political and economic capital, the U.S. had the opportunity to shape and guide these institutions, and therefore the small and mid-level powers that joined them, in ways that aligned with American interests and its vision of a “liberal world order.”

However, with the growth and development of other nations including China, India, and the European bloc, comparative U.S. influence has begun to decline. At their most basic level, multilateral institutions encourage coordination between world leaders by facilitating opportunities for information sharing. Though they haven’t always lived up to their full aspirations and potential, multilateral institutions are vital elements of the world order that help to equalize great power disparities and allow each state to seek their own interests within more broadly cooperative agreements and strategies. Consequently, the rising power of new nations has increased their influence within the multilateral institutions and, in some instances, has resulted in attempts to constrain U.S. action. This is not the first time this has happened – in previous instances, such as during the Cold War when conflict between the U.S. and Russia paralyzed the UN Security Council, the U.S. has temporarily withdrawn from multilateral institutions in favor of acting unilaterally to pursue its foreign policy goals.

The significance of the shift in the world order now, then, is that the decline in U.S. power relative to the rise of other nations has made it more difficult for the U.S. to accomplish its international aims, both within and without multilateral institutions. The resulting domestic criticisms have set the stage for the U.S. to turn inward. The threat of a more permanent U.S. withdrawal from the world stage jeopardizes these institutions that rely on U.S. financial and symbolic support and significantly reduces their potential for addressing global issues. An increasingly multipolar world order and a strong sense of multilateralism would seem to logically go hand-in-hand. However, as the international stage reorients to its new reality, multilateral institutions are at risk of being left behind.

Yet, despite the worst fears and perhaps best efforts of some global leaders, multilateralism and multilateral institutions are not dead. Rather, they are at a crossroads, facing a set of competing challenges that have exposed their weakened structures at an accelerated pace. The first challenge – the leadership challenge – has been spurred by the rise of populist and nationalist rhetoric and the growing number of leaders that employ it. To blame this entirely on U.S. President Donald Trump would be to give him and his “America First” administration too much credit. However, his disregard for political norms and practices and refusal to make symbolic sacrifices have paved the way for others to similarly spur multilateralism instead of confront its second challenge – the institutional challenge.

Multilateral institutions like the United Nations (UN), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the Group of Twenty (G20) have been wholly unprepared to respond effectively to the leadership challenge in two significant and impactful ways. First, they are unprepared to transition from a single, de facto guarantor of leadership (often the U.S.) to a system of numerous countries and actors seeking primary influence. Second, they have shown themselves to be unable to transition from addressing localized and regionally isolated problems to addressing more unconstrained global challenges such as climate change. The survival of multilateralism will depend, in part, on an ability to adjust and adapt to changing circumstances and to fundamentally improve institutional efficacy to remain a valuable forum for international actors who might otherwise prefer unilateral action.

The Leadership Challenge

A principle irony of multilateral institutions is that they are highly dependent on the financial support of their individual member countries. Moreover, it is those very countries, including the world’s larger powers that are able, at times, to reject the very constraints imposed by multilateralism and to instead act unilaterally. For example, since his election in 2016, President Trump has, in many ways, directed the U.S. on this path, seeking to limit U.S. engagement in the multilateral arena. Notably, the U.S. reneged on the Paris Climate Accords in June 2017 and withdrew from the UN Human Rights Council in June 2018. President Trump has also questioned the value of U.S. financial support for the UN. As of December 2018, the U.S. had contributed more than $674 million to the UN’s collective budget for 2019, covering approximately 22 per cent of the total requested funds. Other top contributing countries came nowhere close to that level of support: China contributed $367.9 million or 12 per cent, Japan offered $262.4 million or 8.5 per cent, and Germany supplied $186.6 million or six per cent. The combined total of all European country contributions reached only $844 million.

As a result, the Trump administration’s proposed funding cuts to the UN system combined with its extreme skepticism of international agreements have accelerated a veritable leadership vacuum – one that China, Trump’s primary trade foe, has been quick to step into.

Given China’s status as a significant world power that is likely to pursue unilateral actions, it may seem counter-intuitive that it would seek to fulfill a leadership role supportive of a multilateral regime. Indeed, in the past, China’s approach to multilateral institutions has been one of skepticism, viewing opportunities for multilateral engagement as veiled opportunities for co-option by Western powers. In recent years, however, China’s approach has seen a marked shift in which Chinese leadership has come to recognize that unilateral action can often fall far short in addressing pressing global challenges and that China’s participation in the multilateral system increases its own access to, and support of, countries in the developing world which China sees as valuable business and investment partners.

In this way, China has, in fact, accelerated its strategy to support the multilateral regime, as seen in part by significantly increasing its financial support for the UN peacekeeping system; between 2013 and 2018, Chinese contributions rose from three per cent to 10.25 per cent of the total UN peacekeeping budget. For China, multilateralism now often appears preferable to unilateralism – although frequently only in instances when it suits it. For example, while China is eager to benefit from the international agreements reached at the World Trade Organization, it is much more reticent to allow other UN bodies to appear intervening in China’s “internal affairs.”

China’s adaptive, self- interested strategy for engagement with the UN and other multilateral institutions is not unique among other global actors. The international community should be keen to the fact that there is a major difference between seeking greater influence within the existing multilateral system as opposed to seeking to turn it into a tool solely for national gain. In this respect, it remains unclear which path China will pursue.

In contrast, and among other key global actors, many European Union (EU) member states have a decidedly strong incentive to preserve multilateral institutions, including as a means to counterbalance China’s influence. The EU has been limited in this arena, however, by its own internal divisions; Brexit, for example, has raised questions about the stability and future orientation of European economic and security agreements while other EU leaders, like Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, have interpreted President Trump’s dismissal of multilateralism as “permission from, if you like, the highest position in the world so we can now also put ourselves in first place.”

In recognition of these challenges, all 28 EU Foreign Ministers met in June 2019 at the Foreign Affairs Council in Brussels to update the “EU Global Strategy” and to reaffirm their commitment to international institutions and multilateral practices. The EU strategy includes a commitment to enhancing public support for multilateralism, thereby attempting to restrain some of the instability brought on by the tensions between U.S. and China. This effort will include a focus on demonstrating how multilateralism works, through the signing of multilateral agreements like the Paris Climate Accords and through coordinated messaging campaigns. If conducted effectively, this strategy could have a stabilizing effect on the current international leadership challenge.

Within this seemingly deepened commitment to multilateralism, the EU Foreign Ministers also took steps to acknowledge the equally pressing institutional challenges in maintaining the multilateral regime. Incorporated within the EU commitment’s three strands of action were statements addressing the “need to recognize the changing world we live in and extend multilateralism to new global realities” and addressing the reality that “multilateral organizations must be fit for purpose and this requires reform.” The next section of this paper will further outline the opportunities and limitations inherent in confronting these institutional challenges.

The Institutional Challenge

The fact remains that simply preserving international institutions, not to mention strengthening them, is a significant challenge when confronted by the uncertainty and irregularity of strong U.S. leadership. In this context, many international actors have taken steps to fill the leadership gap and to press ahead with multilateral agreements absent U.S. engagement. For instance, the UN Global Compact on Migration (GCM) was adopted by 164 of 193 members of the United Nations in December 2018, despite U.S. withdrawal from the agreement one year prior. In a similar vein, no country has followed the U.S. in exiting the Paris Climate Agreement. While these agreements may suggest forward progress, the strength of these agreements, absent U.S. participation, remains a cause for concern.

Indeed, numerous policymakers and activists have argued that neither agreement goes far enough to sufficiently address the salient issues, and many others have noted that neither agreement carries the legally binding force of a formal treaty. The GCM, in particular, does not require signatories to take action beyond what they are already doing. Rather, it punts on the issue, leaving countries in charge of their own immigration policies, while committing them only to improving future cooperation in the international migration space.

These concerns go straight to the heart of the problem of adapting multilateral systems to incorporate a multiplicity of actors in an increasingly multipolar world. In circumstances in which a single leading voice is absent and therefore unable to set a standard that all other actors must rise to meet or otherwise follow, competition for influence between multiple mid-size powers is effectively lowering the level at which any compromise can be reached. A veritable “race to the bottom” and to the lowest common denominator, as it were.

As a result, agreements that are reached are likely to become progressively weaker as each actor attempts to cede less power and make fewer sacrifices. While it may not always be advisable to have a single power dominating a multilateral system, navigating the desires of numerous smaller powers presents a whole new variety of problems. This emerging and often unanticipated set of issues has been compounded by the new and complex crises facing the international community, including climate change, refugee resettlement, and escalating economic inequality.

Furthermore, the traditional instruments of multilateralism are increasingly plagued by institutional inertia. Multilateral institutions are often content to pursue strategies and processes that have – as noted by the UN Secretary-General in his call for member-states to participate in institutional reforms – led to clogged communication channels, fragmented funding, and a lack of accountability. This institutional inertia further underscores concerns regarding multilateralism’s relevance, legitimacy, and overall effectiveness, thereby encouraging the continued disengagement from or supplanting of multilateral institutions by other, sometimes more innovative and flexible formats and arrangements.

For example, regional institutions such as the Organization of American States (OAS), African Union (AU), and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) demonstrate one such strategy for potentially achieving a more desirable middle ground between strong, constraining multilateral institutions that may dissuade larger powers from engagement and a truly multipolar system where compromise becomes increasingly difficult. In contrast to the often unwieldy processes experienced in multilateral formats, “minilateralism,” as it is known, is fast becoming an increasingly attractive platform in which nation states form voluntary ad hoc groupings in part composed of trans- governmental stakeholders (specialized sub-units of domestic governments) that come together to address specific issues. These groupings are finding minilateral agreements uniquely capable of incorporating robust discussions on security and trade, both key topics that have traditionally been dominated by larger multilateral institutional format.

The rise of these more localized, limited institutions suggests that, for small and mid-level states, the desire to work across borders has not been eliminated. Rather, it is the multilateral institutions themselves that have become unappealing, and for which these groupings have served as a substitute. Look no further than the collaboration between the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), who aim to establish a development bank and contingency fund to offer countries a financial alternative to the World Bank and the IMF.

Notwithstanding its demonstrated success in trade and regional development, minilateralism still seems unlikely to fully overtake the place of the all-encompassing multilateral institution. The world is so intimately interconnected and global issues such as international economic development and climate change require globally coordinated strategies which can only be developed in a multilateral forum.

The Path Forward

It seems unavoidable to state that multilateralism will have to take on a new shape and form as it adjusts to the array of challenges facing the international order. Change is unlikely to come from major global powers whether in instances when they derive benefit from the status quo multilateral structure or when they disparage it. However, instances of disparagement may yet yield unintended positive impacts. For example, rather than taking cues from individual leaders of powerful nations, the future of multilateral engagement and cooperation may very well be led from the “bottom-up.” Indeed, civil society organizations and regional institutions are increasingly demanding a voice and are finding previously unheard-of successes in helping both set and drive national and international agendas. The concept of “global citizenship,” including among nongovernmental actors, is gaining traction and is, in many instances, combatting the norms and ideas of nationalist rhetoric.

Individual and national leadership is, and always will be, an important driving force in multilateralism. But leadership will change and new leaders will emerge. While the new world order will require a restructuring of institutions, it is important that these changes not be implemented as a knee-jerk reaction to the current leadership challenge. President Trump may have upended norms within the multilateral system, but for the most part, other world leaders have continued to play by the rules. To enact changes that reflect the multilateral system only as Trump currently sees it would be a mistake. The reformation and reorientation of multilateral institutions should instead reflect opportunities for further participation by mid-level powers and civil society, as well to develop structures and agreements that incentivize states to cooperate in new problem-solving formats. No matter how important the U.S. may be, or may have been, to the multilateral order, other international actors must resist the temptation to follow-the-leader and reject multilateralism out of hand.

Conclusion

Multilateral institutions have yet to catch up to the changing world order and their foundational weaknesses have been exacerbated and exploited. The recent tumult of the multilateral system should be a wake-up call. Multilateralism is not dead, but it is at a crossroads. It must resolve the institutional challenges that have been exposed – principally, the competition for influence between emerging powers and a widespread unpreparedness to address global, rather than regional challenges. Doing so will reduce the consequences of the leadership challenges brought on by state actors who prefer unilateral action.

Multilateralism requires leadership, support, and engagement from numerous major players. Current institutions, however, have been dependent on a single driving force, namely the United States, for far too long. Many of the problems now facing the global community require international coordination and cannot be handled unilaterally; neither the U.S. nor China can singularly halt climate change, resolve the refugee crisis, or fund all the development projects necessary to improve quality of life across the globe. The threat of disengagement presented by the current leadership challenge has increased the urgency with which these issues must be resolved. Multilateral institutions must be prepared to address long-term and wide-ranging challenges, regardless of the whims of more short-term leaders.

In the same speech in which he referenced the decline in trust and the rise in unpredictability between international actors, UN Secretary-General Guterres also reflected that “In the end, multilateralism is nothing more than countries coming together, respecting one another, and establishing the forms of cooperation that guarantee peace and prosperity for all in a healthy planet.”

For all their flaws, multilateral institutions and multilateralism as a whole have played valuable roles and demonstrated significant success in a variety of areas, including reducing youth and maternal mortality, providing development assistance to emerging economies, and preserving human rights. As the global order has changed and new international challenges have arisen, multilateral institutions have been tasked with addressing a whole new range of issues. There is nothing, however, to suggest that they cannot continue to adapt.

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